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Introduction^
The resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong by the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC) was unique in the decolonization 
history of the United Kingdom. For the first time a piece of British 
colony was returned to another sovereign power without becoming 
an independent country. For the PRC, the resumption of sovereignty 
was a natural course of event because China had never admitted that 
Hong Kong was a colony of the United Kingdom. After initial 
contacts between Britain and China in the late 1970s, Chinese 
government decided to take back Hong Kong in 1981. In 1982, the 
fourth constitution since the founding of the PRC promulgated the 
notion of Special Administrative Region. 1 The principle of "one 
country， two systems” was devised to solve the issue of sovereignty 
of Hong Kong in 1997. In recovering Hong Kong, tiie Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) encountered a dilemma: on the one hand, it 
would like to resume sovereignty over Hong Kong; on the other 
hand, it would like to maintain the status quo as to preserve 
prosperity and stability of Hong Kong. Hopefully， the “one country, 
two systems” could solve the problem.
Now fours years after the handover, people would ask the 
question whether the notion of “one country， two systems1 has been 
successfully implemented. In fact, one could even ask; what is 
actually the principle of “one country， two systems”？ Where is the 
line between “one country” and “two systems”？ The paper attempts
“One Country, Two Systems” m Practice:
An Analysis of Six Cases
1 The Article 31 of the Chinese constitution stipulates that if necessary the state could 
set up a Special Administrative Region (SAR). The specifications of the SAR would 
be decided by laws.
to answer these questions by exploring six cases that occurred after 
the handover. The paper starts with a general discussion on the 
concept, followed by a delineation of six cases and the implications 
of these cases for “one country， two systems” would be drawn. In 
fact, some scholars argued that under “one country， two systems’， 
Hong Kong enjoys a higher degree of autonomy than the 
local/regional governments under Western federal systems.2 The 
paper tries to answer the question by referring to Australian and 
American federal systems.
The Principle of “One Country， Two Systems”
The notion first emerged In the early 1980s and it was formed 
over a number of years after the visit of Lord MacLehose (former 
Hong Kong governor) to Beijing in March 1979.3 In fact, the target 
of application was first aimed at Taiwan, instead of at Hong Kong. 
The CCP listed the reunification with Taiwan as one of the Party's 
three important tasks in the beginning of 1980s. Evidently it was the 
British initiatives on the Hong Kong 1997 issue that forced Beijing 
to reorient its strategy of reunification. The Sino-British Joint 
Declaration was signed in 1984, and Hong Kong's fate was sealed. 
Although the principle of “one country， two systems” was not 
mentioned in the Declaration, the twelve policies within were, in fact, 
to be the concrete, manifestation of the concept. In April 1990, the 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR was passed by the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) and the notion seemed to have been 
substantiated.
The Practice after the Handover
The studies on the implementation of “one country, two 
systems” were mostly “subjective” ones， which means that a sample 
population was selected and interviewed by researchers. They were
2 Xiao, Weiyun,ed. (1990). One Country, Two Systems and the Hong Kong Basic 
Legal System (in Chinese^. Beijing: Beijing University Press, pp.126-127.
3 Wong Man-fong, (1997). China's Resumption o f  Sovereignty Over Hong K ong- 
Processes o f  Decision-making and Implementation (in Chinese), Hong Kong: Baptist 
University, pp.26-28. The first time that China raised this concept publicly was in 
September 1982, when Deng Xiaoping met Margaret Thatcher, then British prime 
minister, in Beijing.
asked a number of questions regarding the principle of etone country, 
two systems". The questions include; Are you satisfied with the 
performance of the principal government officials? Are you satisfied 
with the performance of Tung Chee-hwa? Do you trust the Hong 
Kong SAR government? The collected data were subjective 
impressions of the implementation process.4 On the contrary, my 
paper adopts an “objective” approach which exposes the 
contradictions (political and -legal) in the events or incidents that 
involve relationships between “one country” and “two systems” 
during the implementation process. The following six cases will 
serve to illustrate the tensions between “one country” and “two 
systems”‘
The criteria of choosing the cases are as follows: First, the 
cases engendered heated debate in Hong Kong. Society split into 
two camps. One the one hand, there are those what I would call 
“pro-one country’ camp which comprises leftist politicians, 
members of China^ official establishment such as NPC and CPPCC, 
some pro-China businessmen; on the other hand the “pro-two 
systems55 faction which consist of mostly democrats, academics and 
journalists. Second, each case involve relationsmps between “one 
country” and “two systems”. Third, each case can crystalize the 
relationships between mainland China and Hong Kong/
Case 1 : Legislator Emily Lau!s Lawsuit Against Xinhua News 
Agency
Background
4 Wong Ka-\inu, (2000). The fmplcnicntaiion o f "One Country, Two Systems'' in 
ilon^ Kon^ (in Chinese), Mone Kong: Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, 
the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Five surveys were conducted in April 1998. 
Oclobcr 1998. April 1999. Ko\ omber 1999 and April 2000. To the question whether 
t4one country, two systems" has implemented after the handover, the percentage of 
' W  are as follows: 14.5, 17.7, 15.7, 24.3, and 20.2. Tl-fe percentage o f  ^ yes" are: 46.7, 
51.1，47.1，40.1， and 44.0. the percentage of “general” are: 28.0, 21.4, 2&3, 27.3, 30.2. 
The percentage of ^ don't know/not sure/ refuse to answer'5 are: 10,9, 9.8/8.9, 8.3, 5.5. 
See p . 16.
People may ask why the Robert Chung's case was not included. Personally, I think 
that the case does not involve central-Hong Kong SAR relationships. It is purely an 
internal matter about academic freedom in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Personal Data (Privacy) Ordinance was 
enacted in December 1996. The goal of the Ordinance is to protect 
private individuals in relation to their personal data. The Ordinance 
gives rights to individuals (data subjects) to confirm with the data 
user whether their personal data are held properly and to obtain a 
copy of such data if requested and even to have personal data 
corrected if  necessary. The data users would commit an offence if 
they refuse such request.
Based on the rights bestowed by the Ordinance, Emily Lau, 
the articulated legislator, asked the Xinhua News Agency (renamed 
as Central Government Liaison Office after handover) to give her a 
copy of her personal data that was presumably kept in the secret 
files of the Agency in December 1996. Ten months after the request, 
Xinhua wrote to tell Emily Lau that it did not have the file of 
personal data on her in October 1997. Under the existing law, 
Xinhua had already made an offence as the Ordinance imposes a 40- 
day limit to satisfy the request of personal data by the applicant.
The Commissioner of Privacy deemed that Xinhua had 
violated the Ordinance and reported to Elsie Leung, Secretary of 
Justice of the Hong Kong SAR government, but Elsie Leung 
refused to take legal action against Xinhua without giving any 
reasons. Meanwhile it was found out that Xinhua was not a legally- 
registered organization in Hong Kong, and therefore could not be 
prosecuted under the existing Hong Kong laws and only the man in 
charge of the organization couid be charged. Subsequently, Emily 
Lau launched a private lawsuit against Jiang Enzhu, the Xinhua 
director. '
However, Frank Stock, judge of the court of the first instance, 
refused to grant Emily’s subpoena to summon Jiang to appear in 
court to answer the charges about Xinhua’s alleged breach of the 
Privacy Ordinance, Because, according to the judge, Emily's 
summon was directed at the wrong person. In December 1996, the 
Xinhua director was Zhou Nan, who was replaced by Jiang in 
August 1997, and therefore the case could not be established. 
Consequently, Emily had to pay the fees incurred during the process 
which cost about HK$1.6 million. The failure to pay the fees might 
make Emily bankrupted and might cost her the seat in the legislative
Council (Legco). She finally paid the cost and retained her Legco 
seat. —
Debate
The importance of Emily Lau's case is that it attempts, after 
the takeover by the PRC, to test the status of Xinhua within Hong 
Kong legal jurisdiction. Before the handover, it served as a disguised 
diplomatic organization and after the handover it became a Central 
Government’s power-delegated organization. Under the principle of 
“one country， two systems”， Hong Kong enjoys a high degree of 
autonomy and Hong Kong courts enjoys the final adjudication 
power on all cases except on foreign affairs and defense. As Emily 
said, ill initiated private prosecution against Mr Jiang in 1998, 
because I do not think anyone, including the organs of Central 
Government should be above the law'5.6
Article 22 of the Basic Law stipulates thattc All offices set up 
in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region by the departments 
of the Central Government or by provinces, autonomous regions, or 
municipalities directly under the Central Government, and the 
personnel of these offices shall abide by the laws of the Region.” 
However, in A pril1998, the provisional Legislative Council passed 
the Adaptation of Laws . Ordinance which replaced the British 
Crown by the Chinese state which has a much wider connotation. 
The notion Chinese state includes organizations affiliated with the 
central government or organizations exercising delegated tasks 
prescribed by the central government in accordance with the Basic 
Law. •
The Ordinance exempted the "state organizations'7 from legal 
prosecution for about 500 Ordinances in Hong Kong. However, the 
Pr'n-acy Ordinance was not one of the 500 Ordinances that are not 
applicable to the “state organizations”. It remains a mystery if the 
Privacy Ordinance could be applied to Xinhua/ The case clearly
6 Emily Lau, (2000). ''Bankruptcy looms, but I had to defend my individual rights51, 
South China Morning Post, 14th November.
7 In fact, there are stili 16 Ordinances whose status are not clear four years after the 
handover, for example, Sex Discrimination Ordinance, Patents Ordinance, Mandatory 
Provident Fund Schemes Ordinance, Disability Discrimination Ordinance, etc. See
shows that the “state organizations” are now above the laws of Hong 
Kong and the relevant provisions in the Basic Law are totally 
ignored. Before the change o f sovereignty, Emily Lau lamented, 
aBeijing tried to assure Hong Kong people by pledging the mainland 
authorities would abide by local laws. Four years later, it is still an 
empty promise, and seriously undermines any claim that Hong Kong 
has the rule of law.’’* 8 〜
Case 2: The Case of Cheung Tze-keung^ Arms Smuggling and 
Kidnapping
Background
Cheung Tze-keung, a Hong Kong resident and well known as 
“big spender” or “big boss” in the gangster circle ana his 3 b gang 
members had been committing crimes of kidnapping, arms 
smuggling, illegal trading of explosives, murder and robbery in the 
1990s in mainland China and Hong Kong. Cheung and his members 
were arrested in mainland in January 1998 and prosecuted by 
Guangdong police in September 1998.
One of ms charges was the kidnapping of Victor Li Tzar-kuoi 
in May 1996, deputy chairman of Cheung Kong Holdings, Ltd. and 
son of the property tycoon Li Ka-shing. Cheung demanded a ransom 
of HK$L38 billion. Li family paid the ransom and did not report to 
Hong Kong police. In November 1998, Cheung succeeded in 
kidnapping another property tycoon Kwok Ping-sheung, chairman 
of the Sun Hung kai Property Ltd. and Kwok family paid a sum-of 
HKS600 million to secure Kwok^ release. In Guangdong's trial, 
Cheung and his gangsters were found guilty and sentenced to death 
by the Guangzhou Intermediate People’s Court. He appealed but 
failed and was executed in December 1998.
Debate
Economy Journal,1 5lil May 2001.It would not be wiid of the mark that the ustate 
organizations” enjoys some degree of u ext^a-ter^ t^or^aI t^y ,^ in Hong Kong. See also 
Ming Pao, 23rd June 2001.
8 Emily Lau, (2001)‘ One law for us and none for CPG offices”，26th June 2001.
Cheung held a Hong Kong identity card yet he was tried and 
executed in the mainland. There were altogether 17 Hong Kong 
residents among the 35 gang members. They were either executed or 
sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Many people in Hong 
Kong demanded that Cheung should have been brought back to 
Hong Kong for trial; however, the pro-one country faction supported 
the mainland move.
Their arguments are as follows. First, the mainland courts have 
jurisdiction over Hong Kong residents, for the Chinese Criminal 
Law stipulates that u The Law is applicable to all who commit 
crimes within the territory of the People's Republic of China except 
as stipulated By law. When either the act or consequences of a crime 
takes place within the territory of the People’s Republic of China, a 
crime is to be deemed to have been committed within the territory of 
the People’s Republic of China.” Article 7 of the same law stipulates 
that “This Law may be applicable to citizens of the People’s 
Republic of China who commit crimes outside the territory of the 
People's Republic of China other than the crimes specified in the 
preceding article.5, Since the PRC has already resumed sovereignty 
over Hong Kongs the acts (kidnapping and arms robbery) and 
consequences (arrest) took place in mainland China and Hong Kong. 
Consequently, mainland courts have the right to trial Cheung.
Secondly, there are two principles that regulate criminal 
control internationally, namely area principle and identity principle. 
The area principle states that if the offender commits crimes in a 
particular area or territory, he/she could be tried by the courts of the 
particular area or territory. The identity principle states that the area 
or territoiy is the place where the criminal resides, the courts of the 
place have the right to try him/her. Evidentl)； the trial of Cheung by 
mainland courts is justified on both principles.
Third, Article 19 of the Basic Law states that tlThe Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region shall be vested with independent 
judicial power， including that of final adjiidication.” Cheung Tze- 
keung committed offences both in mainland and Hong Kong. 
According to the Basic Law, Hong Kong is vested with “independent 
right" to judge all cases in the Region but it is not the “only place”
to have the right of trial. There is great difference of ''independent 
right” and “only one’’.
Fourth, Hong Kong government did not request mainland 
authorities to extradite Cheung to Hong Kong. Moreover, the Li and 
Kwok families, though being the victims of the kidnapping, did not 
report to the police and therefore the case cannot be established in 
Hong Kong. In fact, Cheung's wife and brothers were once arrested 
by Hong Kong police and their banking accounts were frozen. 
Because o f lack of evidence, they were released and their banking 
accounts defrozen.
Nonetheless, the pro-Hong Kong autonomy people think 
otherwise. Their arguments are follows. First, Article 19 of the Basic 
Law provides that uthe Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
shall be vested with independent judicial power, including that of 
final adjudication.” Furthermore， Article 18 of the Basic Law states 
that ^National Law shall not be applied in the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region except for those listed in Annex III to this 
Law.M There are six national laws that are applicable to Hong Kong 
SAR and Criminal Law is not one of them.
Secondly, the crimes, in fact, mainly took place in Hong Kong 
and Cheung was a Hong Kong resident. The kidnappings occurred 
in Hong Kong and other crimes such as smuggling of arms and 
illegal trading of explosives were secondary offences and they were 
preparations to the kidnappings. Article 24 of the Uim a's Criminal 
Procedure Law states that ua criminal case shall be under the 
jurisdiction of'the people's court in the place where the crime was 
committed, it is more appropriate for the case to be tried by the 
People’s Court in the place where defendant resides，” In Cheung’s 
case, it was widely perceived that he should have been tried in Hong 
Kong and e\fen his family made such a request.
Third, there were political considerations. Knowing the 
widespread corruption and the nature of Leninist party dictatorship 
in mainland, Hong Kong residents have certainly doubts over the 
impartiality of the judicial system. People believe that Hong Kong 
has independent judicial power. Hong Kong people are worried 
about the unlimited possible application of the PRC's criminal code
to all Hong Kong residents, who are also Chinese citizens after the 
handover. The fear is that Hong Kong residents who commit 
offences outside the territory of the PRC may be tried and penalized 
under article フ of the criminal law， particularly true for political 
dissidents currently residing in Hong Kong. Some suggested that, to 
allay this fear, within the context of article 1, Chinese citizens do not 
include Hong Kong residents.
. -
The Chinese Criminal Code covers all territories of China. 
Hong Kong was made an exception because of “one country， two 
systems". Nonetheless, from the way that the Chinese authorities 
interpret it, the Basic Law could not take precedence over the 
Chinese national laws. It is clear that Hong Kong’s “exceptionality” 
has limitations. It is not clear to what extent this “exceptionality” 
would go. It seems that a constitutional framework should be 
established as quickly as possible to govern the legal relationships 
between China and Hong Kong. Martin Lee, the leading democrat in 
Hong Kong, said that 5,This is not an isolated case... Until there is an 
acceptable arrangement governing the rendition of offenders 
between Hong Kong and mainland China, the aone country, two 
systems” cannot be administered.’’9 Ivan Tang Yiu-wing，Cheung’s 
lawyer in mainland, said that u It was not a death sentence for Big 
Spender but also for the idea of ‘one country, two systems’’’.10 The 
fundamental issue in this case is that a set of clear criteria, 
acceptable and well understood by Hong Kong and mainland, for 
handling cross border crimes is lacking. The fact that Hong Kong 
people are reluctant to move along this direction is due to the 
enormous differences of the legal s)'stems on both sides. At the end, 
power decides. 11
Case 3: The National People’s Congress's Reinterpretation of 
Right of Abode
Background
9 South China Morning Post, 2,ld November 1998. 
w South China Morning Posl, 13lh November 1998.
!1 Yeung, C .(1998), llThe case that threatens our autonomy,,! South China Morning
Post, \4 (h November.
Under the British rule, the mainlanders who overstay in Hong 
Kong or came to Hong Kong illegally would repatriated back to 
mainland. Before and a各er the handover in 199フ， there was a great 
influx of mainland-born children of Hong Kong residents into Hong 
Kong through either two-way permits or illegally. After 1st July 1997, 
colonial rule ended and the Basic Law became effective. These people 
claimed that, according to the Basic Law provisions, they have the 
right of abode in Hong Kong and they refused to go back to mainland 
China. On 3rd April 1998, the High Court decided that in the initial 
stage the right of abode was given to the children of Chinese 
nationality born to Hong Kong residents, including the children of 
illegitimate birth. These children could enjoy unconditional right of 
abode in the Territories right away while those who came after 1st July 
1997 have to be repatriated back to mainland and they must apply for 
the Certificate of Entitlement issued by the mainland authorities 
before they come. Some mainlanders appealed to the Court of Final 
Appeal (CFA).
One 29th January 1999, Andrew Li, the Chief Justice of the CFA, 
issued the verdict, declaring that the following categories of people 
were entitled to the right of abode in Hong K ong:1 )Mainland-born 
children o f Hong Kong residents, their parents need not to be Hong 
Kong permanent residents when the child was bom; 2) Non-marital 
born children of Hong Kong residents (according to the law of 
equity); 3) Before 10th July 1997, Hong Kong born children by 
mainland wife whose husband was Hong Kong resident; 4) From 
the period of 1st July 1997 to 29th January 1999, children of Chinese 
nationality to Hong Kong residents who had claimed their right of 
abode from the immigration Department of Hong Kong; 5) One way 
permit and the Certificate of Entitlement, both issued by the 
mainland authorities, became separated, which means that the 
potential irnmigrants to Hong Kong do not need the Certificate of 
Entitlement to Hong Kong.12
According to the Government’s estimation, the potential and 
actual immigrants to Hong Kong would amount to 1 .0 / million in 
the next decade, if the CFA's verdict was implemented. The potential 
influx of immigration would bring enormous pressure on housing
12 www.info.gov.hk/jud/guicie.2cs/htrnl/cfa/judrnt/facv_14_16—98.htm
10
planning, medical services, education provisions, and economic 
development as a whole. The total expenditure for the next 10 years 
would be HK$710 billion and annual expenditure HK$33 billion. 
The government warned that Hong Kong economic system would 
collapse. On 18th May 1999, Tung Chee-Hwa, the Chief Executive 
of Hong Kong SAR government, wrote a letter to the State Council 
in Beijing, requesting the State Council to ask the NPC to reinterpret 
the relevant right of abode provisions in the Basic Law .13 On 26th 
June 1999, tKe NPC Standing Committee (SCNPC) reinterpreted the 
Basic Law's right of abode provisions. After the reinterpretation, the 
government estimated again that the potential1,6 million immigrant 
figures were reduced only to 1フ0,000■ The reinterpretation of the 
SCNPC was seen to have solved the huge population influx problem 
created by the verdict of the CFA.
Debate
The Article 22 (4) of the Basic Law states that “For entry into 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other 
parts of China must apply for approval. Among them, the number of 
persons who enter the Region for the purpose of settlement shall be 
determined by the competent authorities of the Central People's 
Government after consulting the government of the Region/ 5 The 
SCNPC interpreted that u All persons in the mainland including 
those born outside Hong Kong of Hong Kong permanent residents, 
must have a Certificate of Entitlement from the relevant authorities 
for entry into HKSa R. Otherwise, their coming to Hong Kong 
would be unlawful.”14
Article 24(2)(3) states that u (2) Chinese citizens who have 
ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less 
than seven years before or after the establishment of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region,’’ “(3) Persons of ihinese nationality 
of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those residents 
listed in categories ( 1 ) and (2).” The SCNPし interpreted the article’s 
subsection as to mean that it covered only those children one or both 
of whose parents were permanent residents of Hong Kong at the 
time of their birth. It went on to state that the legislative intent, a
13 Ming P ao ,11ih June 1999.
]4 MingPaoy2 t hhm e  1999.
concept alien to common law tradition, of this sub-article as well as 
of the whole of article 24(2) was reflected in the Resolution of the 
Preparatory Committee adopted by the NPC on 10th August 1996.i5
According to the CFA’s verdict, those who were born in 
mainland before or after one of their parents obtains the residency 
rights are entitled to have the right of abode in Hong Kong. Under 
the SCNPC5s reinterpretation, only those children one or both of 
whose parents were permanent residents of Hong Kong at the time 
of their birth have the right of abode. Moreover, all the potential 
immigrants in China mainland must obtain the Certificate of 
Entitlement in line with the existing practice before coming to Hong 
Kong; otherwise, their presence would be unlawful. Moreover, 
according to the SCNPC's interpretation, the CFA has made a 
mistake for it failed to demarcate the internal affairs of Hong Kong 
and affairs between Hong Kong and mainland. If  it is the latter, the 
CFA must seek a priori interpretation of the relevant article first 
before the CFA makes a decision.
A controversy arises owing to a lack o f clear criteria that 
separate the purely internal affairs o f Hong Kong and affairs 
between Hong Kong and mainland. The Basic Law gives only a 
general guideline. Article 158 (3) stipulates that ‘‘ The courts of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also interpret other 
provisions o f this Law in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts 
of the Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions 
of this しaw concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the 
Central People's Government, or concerning -the reiationship 
between the Central Authorities and Region, and if such 
interpretation will affect the judgment on the cases, the courts of the 
Region shall, before making their final judgments which are not 
appealable, seek an interpretation of the relevant provisions from the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress through the 
Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the Standing Committee 
makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned, the courts of 
the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the 
interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments 
previously rendered shall not be affected.” In this case, the Basic
15 Ibid.
12
Law was violated because the verdict of the CFA was completely 
overturned. The SCNPC pronounced its reinterpretation of the Basic 
Law on 26 June 1999.16
The move engendered hot debates. The legal field was 
divided- the Bar Association strongly against and the Law Society 
for Ronny Tong, the then chairman of the Bar Association, rejected 
the move and argued that th^ move wa_s against the Basic Law and 
“unconstituti6nal”. 17 18The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
strongly criticized the move and argued that it appeared to be a 
"clear violation of the principles of judicial independence and the 
power of final adjudication provided by Articles 2 and 82 of the 
Basic Law‘” l8s
Elsie Leung, the Justice Secretary, naturally defended the 
reinterpretation as constitutional. The SCNPC has the right to 
reinterpret the verdict o f the territory’s highest court Furthermore, 
the move was for the benefit of Hong Kong society as a whole as 
Hong Kong simply could not afford to spend so much on the 
potential new immigrants in ten years if the verdict of the CFA was 
carried out. She pointed out that the critics did not understand how 
the Basic Law operated after the handover. The SCNPC’s 
reinterpretation shows that the Basic Law could be applied to solve 
emergent problems.19
There was support from overseas academic institutions. 
Professor Paul, Gewirtz, director of the Law School in Chinese Law 
at Yale University, supported the move, stating that when any court 
declared any decisions, far-reaching consequences of the verdict on 
society was one of the considerations. When the right of abode 
involved the central-local relationships, the NPC should reinterpret 
the details of the immigration laws. In almost all the countries in the
16 Margaret N g ,1999. Ming Pcio, "29th January as demarcation day is not fair and 
U3iconstitutiona],\  30th June,
17 MingPao. Ronny Tong. "Amending the Basic Law is the only constitutional 
move,'* 17th May 1999.
18 Quoted from Margaret Ng,(1999). '"Wrapped up in secrecy15, in South China 
Morning Post, 4th June.
19 Ta Kung Pao, 28th February, 2000.
13
world, the court would not deal with the issue of the right of abode. 
Instead, the administrative branch would take up the issue. 20
In general, Hong Kong residents supported the reinterpretation 
of the SCNPC. Before the reinterpretation,, the consequences of the 
large amount of immigrants was not announced, a public opinion 
was conducted. At that time only 32% of the interviewees supported 
the NPC. However, after the government’s estimation of the 
potential influx of new immigrants was publicized, the supporting 
rate for the reinterpretation shot up to 60.1% to its heel.21 2
Aside from the legal niceties, what is at stake here is the 
political impact on the implementation of “one country, two 
systems”. Most importantly, the SCNPC^ reinterpretation of the 
right of abode has set a precedent^for the NPC5s intervention into 
Hong Kong internaF aFfairs. Albert Chen ilung-yee, dean ot ffie Taw 
faculty o f Hong Kong University, expressed the worry that the 
reinterpretation failed to spell the mechanisms under which the 
reinterpretation would be sought. This would surely undermine the 
foundation o f the rule of law.?2
Moreover, this also set a precedent for the executive’s 
intervention in the otherwise independent judicial process. 
According to the Article 158 of the Basic Law, it should be the CFA 
that would seek reinterpretation of the relevant provisions from the 
SCNPC, not the executive branch. This has set up a precedent 
wSiereby the executive branch could intervene in the verdict of the 
CFA if it loses legal battles by requesting the SCNPC to reinterpret. 
In fact, the SCNPC^ reinterpretation was a political move which 
brought the taming of the CFA of Hong Kong.2-3
Case 4: Sally Aw Sian's Prosecution
20 Hong Kong Economic Daily, 29th April 2000.
21 Wen Hul Pao, ] st May 1999.
22 South China Morning Post, 19th May 1999.
2j See Wong Yiu-chung (2001). "Post-handover Politics in Hong Kong: Institutional 
Changes, Legitimacy Crisis, and Chma’s Intervention”， in Asian Thought and Society, 
Vol.XXVI, No. 76, Jan/April, pp. 51-67.
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Background
Sally Aw Sian is a media tycoon in Hong Kong, In mid-1997, 
the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) started to 
investigate a fraud case involving three top executives of the Hong 
Kong Standard, one of the newspapers owned by Sally Aw Sian, the 
chairperson of the Sing Tao Holdings, Ltd. It was found that the 
three executives had deliberately inflated the circulation figures o f 
the newspaper. Henrietta So Shuk-wa, the general manager of the 
Hong Kong Standard Newspaper, David Wong Wai-shing, a 
circulation director and Tang Cheong-shing, a finance manager, all 
conspired to create the fraud.
Circulation figures are of vital importance to advertisers, 
which provide much of the revenue for the newspaper. The Audit 
Bureau of Circulation (ABC) in the United Kingdom would issue a 
certificate of figures for the circulation if the newspaper used its 
service. ABC was given false documents and inflated circulation 
figures.
The three defendants were convicted and sentenced to jail 
from 4 months to 6 months. Despite the fact that Sally was 
mentioned in the prosecution documents of the ICAC, the 
Department of Justice of Hong Kong SAR decided not to prosecute 
her on the grounds that Elsie Leung, Secretary of Justice, declined to 
reveal. The Legco Councils were angry, legal experts were shocked 
and society in general was confused. On 4 February 1999, after the 
first two rejections, Elsie Leung finaliy consented to be present to be 
inqinsitioned about the reasons or lack of reasons for not prosecuting 
Sally.
Elsie Leung raised firstly a “public interest” argument. She 
said that from 1996 to 1998, several Hong Kong newspapers were 
closed down, and Sing Tao Holdings was facing financial 
difficulties. The company was negotiating with banks to regroup 
restructuring, even selling. If  the compan^ had been sued, the Group 
might have stopped operation and cost several thousand of jobs. 
Legal experts were shocked by her thesis, for this thesis amounts to 
argue that the rich and the powerful enjoy legal immunity because 
they usually own factories or companies.
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„. In a move to quell criticism from society, Crenville Cross, 
director o f public prosecution, wrote letters to the judicial 
departments of 13 countries and asked them if they would talce into 
consideration workers5 unemployment and bankruptcy of companies 
as “public interest” in the prosecution process. Out of eleven 
responding countries, seven replied that they would, three countries 
would not consider and one country refused to comment. Margaret 
Ngs the legislator from the legal constituency, was angered by the 
explanation so that she moved to motion a vote of no confidence in 
Elsie on 10 March 1999. The motion was defeated by 20 to 31. 
However, later on, _bisie offered the second reason not to prosecute 
Sally: lack o f evidence.
Debate
Many thought that the non-prosecution involved political 
consideration. Elsie Leung was 4 founding member of the pro-CCP 
political party Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong 
Kong (DAB).24 Before the appointment of the Secretary of Justice, 
she was a deputy of the NPC. Sally had long standing relationships 
with Elsie Leung as well as Tung Chee-Hwa, the Chief Executive. 
Most important o f ali, Sally has been a deputy o f Chinese Peopled 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) for many years, and her 
close relationship with the CCP dates to the 1960s.25
Ronald ArcuNi, the legislator and then chairman of the Legco 
Bills ComnVittee, said that the element of “public interest” would be 
considered only if there was sufficient evidence. Now Elsie Leung 
offered the “public interest” thesis first, and only provided the
The DAB is widely regarded as the underground CCP in Hong Kong. Tsang Yok- 
shing, the current chairman of the DAB, refused to answer when asked if he was a 
communist party member. His brother Tsang Tak-shing once the chief editor of Ta 
Kung Po in Hong Kong , serves as a research staff in the Central Policy Unit, the 
think tank o f the Hong Kong government.
25 According to a senior CCP member Kang Yiu-yii who left the CCP in 1989 and is 
now in exile in the United States, Sally and the CCP have long term relationships. See 
Kang Yiu-yu,1998. The Secrets o f the CCP's Hong Kong Policies (in Chinese), Hong 
Kong: Tin Yuan Publishers, pp.54-55.
16
“insufficient evidence” later when the first reason was heavily 
attacked. This shows how confusing the mind of Elsie Leung was.26
Margaret Ng lamented that Elsie Leung's explanation of 
“public interest” called into question the most important concept of 
the rule of law: equality before the law. It gave international 
cormmmity the impression to whether you would be prosecuted 
depended not on wliether you have brojcen the law, but on who you 
are. She questioned whether Elsie Leung was qualified for the job as 
Secretary of Justice. Her motion of no-confidence was defeated.27 
In a survey conducted by the Baptist University, the dissatisfaction 
rates for both Elsie Leung and Tung Chee-hwa were 56%, while the 
rates for Anson Chan, the former Chief Secretary and Donald Tsang, 
the incumbent Chief Secretary were respectively 16% and 1 1 %. "8 
The figures show how unpopular Elsie Leung was.
Case 5: The Resignation of Cheung Man-yee
Background
In Ju ly ,1999, Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui proposed a 
utwo state" theory regarding the international status of Taiwan to a 
German Weekly (Voice o f Germany) journalist. In the theory, Lee 
explained that the status of Taiwan towards mainland China should 
not be regarded as one central government, one local government or 
one legitimate government, the other rebellious group. Rather, two 
entities should be treated as equal status in a state to state 
relationship.29
On S 7th July 1999, Cheng An-kuo, the de facto Taiwan 
official representative in Hong Kong, was invited to deliver a Hong 
Kong Letter in a radio programme of the RTHK. In the letter he 
defended the notion oP 'tw o state'1 theory. The Setter triggered strong 
reaction from local pro-CCP groups. Ma Lik, a NPC deputy and the
26 Yeung C. South China Morning Post, 5,h February 1999.
27 Yeung, C. South China Morning Post, 6th February 1999. ン：
2S Baptist University, the Transition Project, Apple Daily, 8th September 2000, The 
number of interviewees was 1329.
29 Ming Pao. uLee Teng-hui explains the meaning of the two states theory5, 21st July 
1999/
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secretary-general of the DAB attacked Cheng’s speech as spreading 
the idea of Taiwan independence and urged the Hong Kong 
government early iegislation of the article 23 of the Basic Law on 
subversion.
On 19th August 1999, Qian Qichen, vice premier responsible 
for Hong Kong affairs, stated publicly that Hong Kong should not 
promote “two state” theory as it contravenes Beijing’s seven 
principles which has governed the Taiwan and Hong Kong 
relationships since 1997.3^ In October 1999, Cheung Man-yee was 
transferred from the post of Director of Broadcasting to the post of 
the principal representative of trade and economic affairs in Tokyo. 
Incidentally, in November 1999, while Cheng was waiting for the 
renewal o f his working visa, Taiwan government announced that he 
would be transferred back to Taiwan to be promoted as the second 
vice-chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council under the Executive 
Yuan.
Debate
There were speculations as to why Cheung was removed. In 
fact, the seeds of discontent had long been sown in 1986 between 
Cheung and pro-Beying factions when she became the Director of 
Broadcasting. In the same year, the then Hong Kong government 
tried to corporatize the Radio Television of Hong Kong (RTHK). 
Nonetheless, because of the strong resistance from the Chinese 
government the corporatization went to the coffin before the 
handover. In March 1998, Xu Simin, the standing member of the 
CPPCC, attacked the RTHK as anti-government and anti-Tung 
Chee-Hwa, despite being a government department. Cheung was 
attacked by Xu that She was still following the style of Chris 
Patten.’’30 1, 一
Because of the historical hostility towards Cheung, it was 
strongly suspected that the transfer of Cheung to Tokyo was due to
30 The gist o f the seven principles is that non-governniental exchanges between 
Hong Kong and Taiwan could be preserved after the handover. All governmental 
exchanges between the two places must be approved by Beijing. The laiwan 
representatives in Hong Kong must adhere to “one China” principle.
31 々 ㈣ e A:"か, 20m October 1999.
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political considerations for several reasons: First, Cheung was 
criticized by Xu many times and Xirs criticism had a receptive ears 
in Beijing. Secondly, the Hong Kong SAR government offered no 
convincing argument to justify Cheung's removal In fact, Cheung 
had expressed the desire to stay on as Director of Broadcasting until 
retirement before the handover. There was no reason for her to move 
to other posts before the retirement. Third, the incumbent principal 
representative Paul Leung w^s removed to make way for Cheung 
without announcing where he moved to. This was hignly abnormal 
in a government reshuffle.
Journalists and academics were worried over Cheung’s 
removal and her departure was seen as a threat to the freedom of 
press. Cheung was a public figure and was widely perceived as a 
staunch defender of press freedom. Many believed that her removal 
signified Beijing’s intolerance over the “two Chinas” standpoint 
promoted by a government radio and TV station.32Many fear that 
article 27 of the Basic Law would become void. The provision states 
that “Hong Kong residents shall have freedom of speech， of the 
press and of publications, freedom of association, of assembly, of 
procession and demonstration; and the right and freedom to form 
and join trade unions, and to strike.”
Case 6: The Wang Fenzhao Incident
Backgroimd
Wang Fengzhao is a deputy director of the Central Liaison 
Office in Hong Kong (formerly Xinhua News Agency). The 
incident started with the second raivvan direct presidential election 
in March 2000. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ticket 
Chen Shu-bian and Annettee Lu Hlsin-iien won the election b\' 
beating Guomindaag (GMT) candidates Lien Chen and Siu Wan- 
cheung, and independent candidates Soopg Chuo-yu and Cheung 
Wing-fa. On 29th March 2000, Hong Kong Cable Television 
interviewed Annettee Lu, the vice-president elected. The Cable TV 
broadcast half part of the interview the next day, and the remaining
32 South China Kdorning Post, 201'1 October 1999.
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half the day after. On 2nd April the Hong Kong Cable TV broadcast 
the whole interview once more. As was well known, the DDP- 
advocated Taiwan independence and sovereignty. Annette Lu 
reiterated the DD5s official position and added that Taiwan people 
did not want to reunify with Mainland. ;
The interview triggered strong reaction from Beijing, in 
particular Taiwan Affairs Department of the State Council. People 
Daily published special commentators article attacked the 
independence views aired by Annette Lu and the broadcasting of the 
interview. On 11 April， Xu Simin， the veteran CPPCC member， 
again served as vanguard of the communist orthodox, warned the 
Hong Kong press, particularly the electronic media, to be cautious 
about disseminating Taiwan’s independence views. On 12th April, 
Wang Fengzhao delivered a speech entitled £CThe principle of One 
China and the Taiwan Issue55 in a seminar organized by the Hong 
Kong Journalist Association.
At the outset, Wang excluded reunification with Taiwan from 
normal news items information. He said that reunification with 
Taiwan is a most sensitive and utterly important national issue and 
therefore, it is the responsibilities of the Hong Kong journalists uto 
uphold the integrity and sovereignty of the country and not to 
advocate "two states" theory and independence of Taiwan. This has 
nothing to do with press freedom,”33 34Wang even hinted that the 
article 23 of the Basic Law on the treason and subversion should be 
enacted as quickly as possible.
In response to Wang's speech, the Hong Kong Journalist 
Association issued a statement immediately, insisting that the press 
should have editorial independence, subject to no external pressure. 
As journalists, their responsibility is to report events as they happen, 
and to be as objective as possible. The reports are not tools to 
disseminate national policiesノ4 Anson Chan, the then Chief 
Secretary for Administration, spoke to the press, four hours after 
Wang's speech that the Hong Kong SAR government adhered to the 
“one China” principle but she also emphasized the importance of the
33 5b"//?ごか’⑽スグ〇^?/喂 Pay/， Apri丨 2000.
34 ''Wang's Remarks Seriously Damaging to Press Freedom" (online), 
vvwvv.hkja.hlv/whatnew/ooo412 ecp.html.
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press freedom and publication of the impartial news reporting were 
vital for Hong Kong. In the article 23, she stated that there had not 
been a fixed schedule for legislation.
Debate
The key issue here is: which one is more important: national 
policies or press freedom ? Despite the article 2フ in the Basic Law， 
China seems to prepare to trample the Law whenever it found it was 
in conflict with its national policies. There seems to be two 
conflicting schools of thought about news reporting in the PRC and 
Hong Kong. Like their Western counterparts, Hong Kong journalists 
believe in genuine press freedom subject to no external pressures 
whatever the sources. They also believe in the impartial report is an 
inherent value in itself. Moreover, government policies cannot be 
taken at face value, criticism rather than applause is more important 
in maintaining democratic values of a society. China's view is just 
the opposite. Its theory is called “mouthpiece” theory in which the 
press basically is a government machinery or department. The 
reporting is tightly controlled by the Central Propaganda Department 
specially on the political sensitive issues such as la iw an^  
reunification, China's US foreign policy, political reform and 
democratization, etc. On these issues, dissenting voice views are 
completely forbidden.
Analysis of Implications
The analysis summarizes the implication for the practice of 
tkone country, two systemsM. All six cases have different nature and 
their implications are different. In case 1 ,Emily Lau attempts to test 
if the Xinhua is above the laws of Hour Kong. The result shows that 
the answer is positive. Secretary Elsie Leung did not prosecute the 
Agency and save no reason, unlike the case of Sally Aw. 
Furthermore, the Adaptation of Laws Ordinance has already 
exempted the “state organizations” from legal immunity for about 
500 Ordinances. But the Privacy Ordinance is not one o f them. 
Clearly, the Agency had made an offence under the existing laws.
Case 2 shows that there lacks a constitutional framework 
whereby cross-border crimes would be satisfactorily dealt with and
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extradition of criminals could be made. However, there exists 
tremendous differences in legal philosophy and legal systems in 
Hong Kong and PRC, such as the presumed innocence, jury system, 
fair trial etcj5. The mainland authorities believe otherwise. What is 
more disturbing is the way that mainland interpreted the Chinese 
Criminal Code, which practically overrules the Basic Law. Any 
residents of Hong Kong would be subject to be repatriated back to 
mainland if they commit an offence either in Hong Kong or outside 
Hong Kong.
Case 3 has the most important impact on Hong Kong, in 
particular as an independent juaiciary. The incident practically 
deprives Hong Kong of the final adjudication power of the CFA. The 
reinterpretation of the NPC has abrogated the power bestowed upon 
the CFA even on the internal affairs of Hong Kong. It practically 
puts the CFA at the mercy of two executive branches, namely the 
Hong Kong SAR government and PRC’s NPC .35 6 To be sure, the 
CFA would be left alone in dealing with non-sensitive issues, but 
the Hong Kong government has the power to overrule the verdict if 
it is unfavorable to it by asking the NPC to reinterpret. The 
reinterpretation case has set a precedent for the NPC to intervene. 
Potentially the NPC could reinterpret every case submitted to the 
CFA.
Case 4 shows that the rule of law that Hong Kong has been so 
proud of before the handover has been losing the luster. Every one 
is equai before the law; however, some are more equal than the 
others. The incident shows that those who have long-standing 
relationship with China are now less likeiy to be prosecuted. As 
mentioned previously, Sally’s friendship with China can be dated 
back to the 1960s. Besides, the Chief Executive is had been a 
director of her Sin Tao Holdings, Ltd. We do not know the friendship 
between the Secretary of justice Elsie しeung and Sally. They must 
be friends since both of them had been deputies of the NPC and
35 A simple introduction of the Hong Kong system, see Peter Smith,(1993). An 
Introduclion to the Legal System o f  Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. 
A Chinese perception of the difference of the Mainland and Hong Kong system, see 
Xiao Weiyun, ed .Ibid, chapters 1-3.
36 The Chinese NPC is not only a legislative body, it is also a power decision-making 
body for the Chinese Constitution stipulates that the NPC is the highest power organ 
in the country ( Article 57).
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CPPCC, both official establishment of the PRC. It is obvious that 
Elsie’s “ insufficient evidence’’ and “public interest” theses excuses 
for non prosecution.37
Case 5 and Case 6 are similar for they are related to Taiwan 
issue. Undoubtedly, reunification with Taiwan is the most important 
and sensitive issue of Chinese external affairs. Wang Fengzhao
,；incident, in fact, is the first,overt intervention by Beijing as the 
Central Government into the internal affairs of Hong Kong 
government. The reinterpretation of the NPC is an “invited 
intervention” by the Hong Kong government. The NPC’s 
reinterpretation has at least a constitutional basis. While Wang's 
intervention is purely policy oriented and has no legal basis at all, 
the case shows that freedom of various kinds is subsumed under 
China's national policies. They could be sacrificed if they are against 
national policies. Case 6 shows that the Hong Kong SAR 
government’ broadcasting station must not spread “splittist” view 
and must conform to the seven principles enunciated by Qian Qichen.
“One Country， Two Systems” and Federalism
T' -The “one country, two systems” principle is supposed serve 
a demarcation line between one country and two systems( It is a 
political arrangement by which the power of the central government 
and regional governments is properly separated. Furthermore, even 
if  there are conflicts of interest or political friction, there are 
constitutional mechanisms whereby conflicts could be solved 
peacefully^ Nonetheless, there is no such constitutionail)' defined
^line of jurrsciiction in the principle of "one country, two systems''.
! Tiie regional governments/ state governments are very powerful vis- 
a-\is the central/federal governments. There are two reasons that 
guarantee the functioning of federalism. Firstly, historically, states 
or regions emerged first and then the local governments united to 
form a federal state. Secondly, both Australian and American
37 There are other recent examples which show that gumxl has become increasingly 
important in the considerations of whether to prosecute for the Justice Department of 
Hong Kong. For example, a son of the former prosecution director who now is a 
judge of a high court was found to possess flings in a rave party. The young man 
studies in the USA and spent vacation in Hong Kong. t,lsie Leung decided not to 
prosecute him. An assistant director of a government department was found 
shoplifting but later the charges were dropped.
23
political systems are Western democracies. Different levels of direct 
elections are held regularly. 38 The—cmistitutions .areへsupreme…k ,  
resolving any conflicts.
On the contrary, China has been a highly centralized 
monolithic state for more than two thousand years. Centralization 
has reached an unprecedented stage during the ideocracy reign of 
Mao Zedong. Not only the reform era in the late 1970s did the 
CCP begin to loosen the grip over Chinese society as a whole/6； One 
country， two systems” seems to be a notion intended as an expedient 
concept for negotiations with the British government in the early 
1980s JThe principle satisfied China, Britain and Hong Kong people. 
For China, it could restore the sovereignty of Hong Kong. For 
Britain, China promised to maintain the capitalist system and British 
legacy could be preserved. For Hong Kong people, China promised 
that the lifestyle and various social and political freedoms could be 
preserved. At that time, facing the Hobsohian choice, the prinsipb 
iadeed^dimmished the—xesistaaee of Hozig....Kong .people. The 
principle is a void concept and its connotation is decided by the 
forces that try to influence the events or incident at a particular 
juncture.
Conclusion
From the analysis of the above six cases, implementation of 
the "one country, two systems55 constitutes the following statements 
in the light of the practice after the handover:
1 )  indeed, there has been very few overt intervention from 
Beijing which has exercised self restraint. The NPC，s 
reinterpretation of the right of abode and the Wang Fengzhao 
incident remain the only two cases of direct interference.
2) There lacks a constitutional mechanism to limit or demarcate 
the power of the central government and Hong Kong. Hong 
Kong is allowed to run its internal afiairs but the definition of 
internal affairs remains at the mercy of Beymg.
38 For Australian Federalism, see John Summers, et al,(1990). Government, Politics 
and Power in Australia, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire. For American Federalism, 
see John C. Shea, (1984). American Government-The Great Game o f  Politics. New 
York: St Martin Press, Inc.
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3) One country always take precedence over the two systems, as 
one senior NPC official publicly claimed.39
4) The Basic Law seems to regulate or restrict Hong Kong but 
not Beijing. The provisions of the Law are put under the 
policies of Beymg, in particular the nationally sensitive 
policies such as reunification with Taiwan and US policies.
5) Policies are subject to changes and obviously there is no 
constitutional guarantee that the principle of aone country, two 
systems55 would remain until the mid-twenty first century.
39 According to Qiao Xiaoyang, vice-chairman of the NPC Legislative Affairs 
Commission, see South China Morning Post, 28!h June 1999.
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